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RASUL V. BUSH: VICTORY FOR ENEMY
ALIENS AS EXECUTIVE EMERGENCY
POWER IS SEIZED
JACLENE D'AGOSTINO*
INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution does not contain emergency
provisions.1 There is not an emergency system of government,
nor any formal acceptance of exceptions to the normal
governmental structure set forth in the Constitution. As a result,
the extent of executive authority during times of crisis has been
questioned throughout much of our nation's history. This
uncertainty has been subject to a diverse range of interpretation
by scholars, Presidents, and various Supreme Court Justices.
Now that the United States has been thrust into an indefinite
period of emergency due to the September 1 1 th attacks, the topic
is again one of current significance. 2
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1 See Michael R. Belknap, Historical Observation: The New Deal and the Emergency
Powers Doctrine, 62 TEX. L. REV. 67, 77 (1983) (mentioning United States' lack of
emergency constitution); see also Saikrishna Prakash, Symposium: The Changing Laws of
War: Do We Need a New Legal Regime After September 11?: The Constitution as Suicide
Pact, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1299, 1301 (2004) (explaining Constitution lacks
"constitution-wide rule of necessity" because although some provisions of the Constitution
contain emergency exemptions, others expressly do not).
2 See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and
the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 726-31 (2004)
(explaining "war on terror" defies traditional analysis because it cannot reach a formal
conclusion and distinction between combatants and non-combatants has become blurred);
Jules Lobel, Rounding Up Unusual Suspects: Human Rights in the Wake of 9/11:
Preventive Detention: Prisoners, Suspected Terrorists, and Permanent Emergency, 25 T.
JEFFERSON L. REV. 389, 410-11 (2003) (arguing that ambiguous nature of United States'
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The Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of the scope of
executive power during times of emergency in Rasul v. Bush.3 In
that case, detainees who were being held at the United States
Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba argued that they had
rights to a habeas corpus proceeding in the United States federal
courts. 4 They sought access to attorneys and courts, knowledge of
the charges against them, and other related rights. 5 The Bush
Administration maintained, based on Johnson v. Eisentrager, 6 a
case from the era of the Second World War, it had the right to
hold detainees at Guantanamo Bay without an opportunity to
petition for habeas corpus. 7 The government asserted that
foreign nationals detained outside of the United States' sovereign
territory may not petition for habeas corpus because it is outside
of federal jurisdiction.8 The Supreme Court's holding granted
detainees the right to petition the legality of their imprisonment
through a habeas corpus hearing in United States federal court. 9
Some have viewed this decision as a rebuke to the expanded
powers of the presidency during this period of emergency, 10 while
opponent in "war on terror" and "indefinite confinement of enemy combatants" establish
permanent de facto state of emergency).
3 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
4 See id. at 471 (noting actions were filed in U.S. district court through relatives and
friends of detainees); see also Michael Greenberger, A Third Magna Carta, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 2, 2004, at S7 (stating petitioners' cases alleged that executive branch improperly
detained them as terrorists and deprived them of access to their families, counsel, and
courts); Habeus Corpus, INT'L L. UPDATE, July 2004, at 7 (stating that detainees' relatives
filed various actions in U.S. District Court for District of Colombia that were construed as
habeas corpus petitions).
5 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 471-72.
6 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
7 See id. at 777-78 (explaining that petitioners could not sue for writs of habeas
corpus as they were enemy aliens who never resided in the United States and their
offenses, detention, trial and punishment all took place outside of U.S. jurisdiction); see
also Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475 (explaining respondents believed Eisentrager was precedent
for circumstances before Court).
8 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 471-72 (2004) (citing holding of district court).
9 Id. at 482.
10 See Peter Irons, 'The Constitution is Just a Scrap of Paper:" Empire versus
Democracy, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1081, 1091 (2005) (suggesting that memo by Justice
Department advocating narrow interpretation of "torture" in context of interrogations
motivated Supreme Court to limit Executive Branch's "inherent" powers); Harold Hongju
Koh, A World Without Torture, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 641, 650-51 (2005) (arguing
Executive Branch's authorization of interrogation techniques approaching torture and
assertion of exclusive control over declarations of war illustrates that current
administration has exceeded its Constitutional authority).
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other commentators believe that it served to impede the
President from effectively responding to a non-traditional war.11
I. HISTORICAL VIEWS OF THE SUPREME COURT ON EXECUTIVE
WARTIME POWERS
The issue of presidential power during times of emergency first
arose during the Lincoln Administration with the case Ex Parte
Merryman.12 In that case, an armed officer arrived at a man's
private home in the middle of the night, claiming that he was
acting under military orders, although he had no warrant for
arrest. The man was imprisoned for alleged treason and
rebellion, without any proof against him. The officer who
arrested him claimed he was authorized by the president to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The 1861 Supreme Court
held that the Civil War did not give the President authority to
suspend a private citizen's right to file a writ of habeas corpus.13
Although the Constitution provides that "the privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases
of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it,"14 this
clause is in Article I, designating Congressional powers.15 The
Court expressly stated that a threat to national security is
insufficient to justify the expansion of Executive power into an
area that had been deliberately delegated to Congress by the
Constitution.16 Therefore, the Supreme Court, in deciding Ex
Parte Merryman, concluded that the Constitution is to be strictly
11 See John S. Baker, Jr., Competing Paradigms of Constitutional Power in "The War
on Terrorism," 19 ND J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLy 5, 9 (2005) (arguing that Rasul
"constitutionalized the constraints" on President's authority, hampering "war on terror");
Gregory Dolin, The Great Writ of Incoherence: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Rulings
on "Enemy Combatants," 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 623, 640-42 (2005) (arguing that Rasul
holding could have detrimental impact on interrogation and intelligence gathering by
military operations).
12 17 F. Cas. 144 (1861).
13 See id. at 149 (asserting that by taking on legislative power of suspending writ of
habeas corpus, President is not fulfilling his constitutional duty of faithfully executing
laws).
14 U.S. CONST. art I, §9, cl.2.
15 Merryman, 14 F. Cas. at 148 (stating Article I does not have even slight reference
to executive powers).
16 Id. at 149 (emphasizing critical value of separation of powers in United States
government).
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interpreted at all times, whether peaceful or tumultuous for the
nation.
The next challenge of presidential action during a national
crisis occurred in Ex Parte Milligan in 1866.17 President Lincoln
had again suspended the writ of habeas corpus of a private
citizen, with congressional authorization through the emergency
provision of the 1863 Habeas Corpus Act.18 The President sought
to hold a military tribunal instead of proceeding in an Article III
court, on the grounds that it was within the "laws and usages of
war,"19 a position the Court declined to endorse. 20 It was held
that the emergency provision of the Habeas Corpus Act did not
contemplate a military tribunal for a private citizen when Article
III courts remained open. 21 Perhaps most importantly, the Court
stated that "the Constitution of the United States is a law for
rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with
the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and
under all circumstances," rejecting the notion of broader
Executive authority during a military national emergency. 22
World War II raised more questions about emergency authority
to a Court that appeared more willing to defer to the executive
during national crises. Ex Parte Quirin23  concerned a
presidential appointment of a Military Commission, which was
ordered to try any citizen, subject, or resident of a nation at war
with the United States who was charged with committing or
attempting to commit wrongs against this nation, subject to the
law of war. 24 President Roosevelt claimed to have acted under his
Article II power as Commander in Chief of the armed forces to
create the commission, and that such wrongdoers should be
denied access to the courts because of their status as "enemy
belligerents."25 The petitioners argued that Roosevelt lacked the
17 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
18 Id. at 109 (listing provisions of Act).
19 Id. at 121.
20 Id. at 121-22 (explaining that times of war do not justify military tribunal for
private citizen).
21 See id. at 127 (listing certain situations in which martial rule is appropriate).
22 Id. at 120-21.
23 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
24 Id. at 22 (quoting presidential proclamation of July 2, 1942).
25 Id. at 24-25. The executive attempted to validate this assertion by stating that
such "enemy belligerents" were a part of the class of people denied access by the
proclamation and were enemy aliens, foreclosing a hearing in any American court. Id.
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constitutional authority to deny a trial by the jury in the civil
courts, a right they were entitled to under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.26 The Court recognized that the Constitution
contains safeguards to protect all who are charged with offenses,
and those safeguards are not be disposed of to inflict punishment
on some who are guilty.27 Under the circumstances of World War
Two, the Court interpreted these safeguards as requiring a "clear
conviction" that the declaration is inconsistent with the
Constitution or congressional legislation. 28 The President in this
matter was acting in accordance with congressional legislation
and his authority as Commander in Chief during times of war.
As a result, the issue of the Executive's authority to establish
military tribunals for private citizens was neither addressed nor
necessary. 29 Nevertheless, the Court expressed that those
presidential actions that might at first glance seem
unconstitutional will be given more scrutiny during times of
crisis, to determine whether they can be upheld.
Ex Parte Quirin is distinguishable from Ex Parte Milligan on
the basis that Quirin involved members of enemy armed forces,
while Milligan concerned a private United States citizen. The
Court appears to favor the preservation of the rights and
interests of American citizens over those of foreign citizens
classified as "enemies." Surprisingly, other cases from World War
Two, such as Korematsu v. United States, 30 which involved
United States citizens of Japanese ancestry, and later cases such
as Rasul, demonstrate that this particular factor is not relevant
to the Court's decision making.
Korematsu is one of the most controversial cases decided by the
Supreme Court in the twentieth century. 31 This decision upheld
26 Id. at 24 (arguing that Military Commission's authority to try defendants violated
Articles of War adopted by Congress).
27 Id. at 25 (citing Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 119, 132 (1866)).
28 Id. (stating that United States is in "grave danger" as consequence of the war).
29 Id. at 28 (declaring that President was acting under authority expressly given to
him by Congress, in addition to his own Article II powers).
30 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
31 See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress and Denial, 51 UCLA
L. REV. 933, 949-55 (2004) (suggesting that majority's focus on petitioner's violation of
exclusion order, as opposed to constitutionality of en masse internment of Japanese
Americans along West Coast, was mere expedient employed by Court to allow it to defer
to precedent and national security fears); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the
2006] 389
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an executive order signed by President Roosevelt that permitted
curfews, reporting requirements, and the removal of individuals
of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast to camps further
inland.32 The Court's rationale for this holding was the fact that
the nation was at war with the Japanese Empire, and that
military authorities feared an attack on the West Coast. 33 The
Court deferred to the executive's order based on the level of
apprehension and the urgency of the situation.34 While this
decision hasn't formally been overruled,35 the Court has long
since abandoned it "in the court of history"36 based on its
deplorable discrimination against United States citizens based on
their ancestry. However, the reason for the abandonment of the
case is unrelated to the Court's treatment of wartime executive
authority. It remains a valid example of the great deference the
Supreme Court has given to the president during times of crises.
In Rasul, the government relied on Johnson v. Eisentrager37as
controlling precedent. Eisentrager dated back to World War Two,
and involved twenty-one German nationals who were captured
by the United States Army in China, after Germany had
surrendered. 38 They were convicted in a military tribunal for
violating the laws of war by engaging in, ordering, or permitting
continued military activity against the United States. 39 Detained
(D)Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30 CONN. L. REV. 961, 987-88 (1988) (purporting
that Korematsu court overlooked ostensible violations of Due Process Clause in favor ad
hoc analysis tailored to meet demands of era).
32 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24 (opining that characterization of relocation centers
for Japanese during wartime as concentration camps was unfounded).
33 Id. at 223.
34 Id. See generally Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93-94 (1943)
(exemplifying prior World War II era case where exigencies of war effort and Court's
unwillingness to disrupt settled judgment of coordinate branches of federal government
Court's led to deferential reading of War Powers clause and, consequently, to upholding of
an American citizen of Japanese ancestry's conviction for violating curfew order imposed
by military on citizens of Japanese descent in designated area).
35 See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
(rendering writ of coram nobis setting aside Korematsu's conviction based on unearthed
evidence withheld during the original prosecution, but noting that "the Supreme Court's
decision stands as the law of this case and for whatever precedential value it still may
have"); see also Alfred C. Yen, Praising With Faint Damnation - The Troubling
Rehabilitation of Korematsu, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (1998) (reminding those who deem
Korematsu as long disavowed that Supreme Court has never overruled the decision).
36 Emilie Kraft Bindon, Entangled Choices: Selecting Chaplains for the United States
Armed Forces, 56 ALA. L. REV. 247, 283 n.208 (2004) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
37 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
38 Id. at 766 (explaining activities of German nationals in China).
39 Id. at 766 (noting that American military tribunal was conducted in China).
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in a German prison, they protested their detention and petitioned
the District Court in the District of Columbia for habeas
corpus. 40  The Supreme Court addressed this case as a
jurisdictional issue, similar to the one presented in Rasul, and
explained that it is the presence of an alien within a jurisdiction
that gives the courts the ability to act.41 Since the aliens in
Eisentrager were being held in a German prison, even though
they were captured by the United States armed forces, it was
determined that they did not have access to the federal courts.
The Court simply stated that non-resident enemy aliens,
especially those who are in the service of the adversary and are
being held outside United States jurisdiction, may not petition
for habeas relief.42
During some emergencies, presidents claim authority over
particular aspects of government that would otherwise not be
within their Article II powers. Courts have often approached this
as a separation of powers issue. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer,43 President Truman issued an executive order to have
the Secretary of Commerce seize possession of most of the steel
mills in the nation.44 The President claimed that this action was
necessary in order to prevent a national crisis that would result
from an impending strike of the mills. 45 At the time, the United
States was involved in armed conflict in Korea, and the president
believed that a steel mill strike would jeopardize national
defense.46 Truman asserted that the constitutional basis for such
action was within his Article II powers as Commander in Chief of
the armed forces, among others. 47 The Court immediately
40 Id. at 765 (expanding on circumstances of petitioners' imprisonment).
41 Id. at 771 (discussing extent of Constitution's jurisdiction in light of Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 35 (1886)).
42 Id. at 776 (discussing origins of rule as deriving from 1813 New York case).
43 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
44 Id. at 582 (addressing facts behind executive order).
45 Id. at 582-83. This strike would have resulted from a labor dispute between steel
companies and labor unions that remained unresolved despite settlement efforts. Id. The
President argued that if steel production was halted, the war effort would be hampered by
scarcity of an "indispensable... component of... all weapons and other war materials."
Id.
46 Id. at 589-92 (citing language of executive order at issue).
47 See id. at 587 (listing Article II powers on which government relied to argue
permissibility of seizures); see also Ken-Rad Tube & Lamp Corp. v. Badeau, 55 F. Supp.
193, 194-95 (W.D. Ky. 1944) (concluding that executive order to seize manufacturing
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rejected this argument, noting that the executive taking
possession of private property, even with the nation's
involvement in a war overseas, was not permissible. 48 In
addition, the Court categorized such an exercise of authority an
infringement on the legislature, as this was more of a lawmaking
activity than one for the military. 49
One of the rationales used by the Court in determining that
seizing the steel mills for national protection was not within
executive military power was the failure of Congress to pass a
provision of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. That provision would
have provided for executive authority to be expanded during
times of emergency to authorize Federal seizures of private
property similar to the one at issue in Youngstown.50 The
congressional rejection of the proposed provision demonstrates a
hesitation of Congress to officially provide for emergency
authority which might blur constitutional lines.
In his concurrence, Justice Jackson introduced a "functionalist"
approach to interpreting the Constitution when determining the
relative breadth of the branches of Federal government. 51 He
argued that, notwithstanding emergencies, a president has three
levels of authority. The first level is where executive authority is
broadest, and that is where there is action pursuant to express or
implied authorization from Congress.5 2 The intermediate level
plant during labor dispute in order to continue production was valid use of authority
during time of emergency or war).
48 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (explaining
Commander in Chiefs authority does not extend to allow seizure of private property to
encourage labor disputes); see also Alpirn v. Huffman, 49 F. Supp. 337, 340 (D. Neb. 1943)
(emphasizing limited circumstances that permit seizure of private property and clarifying
that such power is not solely reserved for "Commander in Chief of the armed forces").
49 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587 (stating that power to seize private property is
province of legislative branch); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976)
(commenting on Framers' intention to ensure separation of powers within Constitution
by delegating Federal power among three branches in Article I, II, and III); Alpirn, 49 F.
Supp. at 339-40 (explaining power of Congress afforded by the Constitution to maintain
U.S. armed forces).
50 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 586 (discussing fear that allowance of seizure would
be interference with collective bargaining); see also 29 U.S.C.S. § 141 (2005) (explaining
that purpose of Labor Management Relations Act is to discourage interference of either
labor or management in legitimate interests of its opposite number).
51 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (proposing "tripartite
analysis" of presidential authority); see also Am. Int'l Group Inc., v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 657 F.2d 430, 443 (D.D.C 1981) (discussing Court's willingness to make
compromises between "the separation of powers" and "exigencies of governance" in
situations where the executive branch has acted and Congress remained silent).
52 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 636-37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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was referred to as the "zone of twilight,"53 meaning, executive
power may exist simultaneously with congressional power in a
certain area if Congress has been silent.54 Finally, the third level
includes situations in which the executive acts against the
express or implied wishes of Congress, and the President is
limited to the powers delegated to the Executive Branch in the
Constitution. 55
Based on Jackson's framework of Executive power, President
Bush's executive detention of enemy aliens without granting
them the right to petition for habeas corpus falls within the first
category, as Congress has granted authority through the
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). However, a
historical overview of the Supreme Court's decisions on the
subject reveals that during the twentieth century, the judiciary
has created a federal common law that grants the executive
exceptional authority to deal with national crises.
II. SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES
On February 26, 1993, citizens of the United States were faced
with the unfortunate realization that terrorist attacks could take
place on our own soil. On that day occurred the first World
Trade Center bombing, in which six people died and more than
one thousand were injured.56 After that attack, there were
multiple plots to commit acts of terrorism within the United
States, including a plan later that year to simultaneously destroy
the United Nations, the George Washington Bridge, and the
Lincoln and Holland Tunnels, which connected New York City to
New Jersey.5 7
53 Id. at 637.
54 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952).
55 Id. at 637-38.
56 News In Brief, N.Y.L. J., Oct. 7, 2003 at 1 (explaining sequence of events that led to
bombing of World Trade Center); see Alison Mitchell, Trade Center Bombing; 2 More
Arrests Give Some Shape to the Puzzle, N.Y. TIMES, March 28, 1993, at 2 (detailing early
Federal investigation into first World Trade Center bombing).
57 Deborah Pines, Terrorism Trial Will Use Questionnaires, Consultants for Jury,
N.Y.L.J, Nov. 9, 1994, at 1 (describing allegations against conspirators as outlined by U.S.
Attorney's Office).
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Recent terrorist attacks on Americans outside of the United
States included the 1998 bombings of our embassies in Tanzania
and Kenya, in which more than two hundred people were killed,
and the October 2000 bombing on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, in
which seventeen American sailors lost their lives. It was
strongly believed that both attacks had been conducted by Al
Qaeda operatives. 58
The Islamic extremists who make up the Al Qaeda
organization and were behind the various plots against America
are citizens of a range of nations from the Middle East to the
United States. Some of the non-American citizens have entered
the nation illegally by using fraudulent documents, while others
have entered legally through use of visas and have remained
here after their expiration.5 9 Terrorist leaders, mainly Osama
Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda organization, have declared
"jihad"60 on America because they consider western governments
to be the tools of the unfaithful since they do not act like, or share
the beliefs of, the Islamic extremists. 61 Al Qaeda opposed
American involvement in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and
generally does not approve of the United States' Mid-East
policies. It was especially infuriated when American troops,
which they referred to as "Satan's U.S. troops," were stationed in
58 See Judge Mukasey, Padilla v. Bush, N.Y.L.J., Dec.10, 2002 at 25 (discussing
international terrorist network that forms Al Qaeda); see also Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda,
Terrorism, and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 328, 330 (2002) (describing series
of terrorist attacks allegedly conducted by Al Qaeda between first and second World
Trade Center bombings); Embassy Bombers Sentenced to Life Without Parole, ON-LINE
NEWS HOUR 5-6 (Oct. 18, 2001), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/octoberOl/
embassy_10-18.html (describing Kenya and Tanzania bombings on August 7, 1998).
59 See U.S. v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 78 (3d Cir. 2003), remanded by U.S. v. Yousef, 395
F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2005) (describing Yousefs entrance into United States via John F.
Kennedy International Airport with passport from Iraq); Second Circuit Upholds
Convictions of Alleged Mastermind of 1993 World Trade Center Bombing Over Arguments
that the U.S. Court Lacked Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over His Alleged Offenses
Committed Outside the U.S., INT'L L. UPDATE, Apr. 2003, at 4 (noting organizer of 1993
World Trade Center bombing entered United States using Iraqi passport and claimed
political asylum).
60 See United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 225, 229-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting
Bin Laden endorsed a fatwa characterizing United States Army as enemies of Islam and
declared a jihad against United States and its followers); see also Jacob J. Akol, Sudan:
Peace in Our Time? NEW AFRICAN, Jan. 1, 2004, at 28 (defining "jihad" as holy war).
61 See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 96 A.J.I.L. 237, 239 (2002) (quoting 1996 declaration of jihad by
Osama Bin Laden against United States and Israel); see also The Case Against Osama
Bin Laden; Full Text of the Summary of Evidence, Released by the British Government,
PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, Oct. 5, 2001, at A-13 (stating that Al-Qaeda is "dedicated to
opposing 'un-Islamic' governments in Muslim countries with force and violence").
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Saudi Arabia, home of Muslim holy sites. 62 In 1998, Bin Laden
made a declaration that Americans must be punished for their
actions. His "fatwa"63 to the Muslim people was published on
February 23, 1998 in a Palestinian newspaper, AI-Quds al'-Arabi,
which stated:
The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies-civilians
and military - is an individual duty for every Muslim who
can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in
order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque
from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of
all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any
Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty
God, "and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all
together," and "fight them until there is no more tumult or
oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God."64
The result of this, among other declarations against the United
States, was the horrific day of September 11, 2001. Over three
thousand innocent American civilians lost their lives to the
attack driven by Al Qaeda's Islamic extremists. 65 The suicide
terrorists hijacked four American commercial flights and used
them as missiles, crashing one into the Pentagon, one into the
ground in Pennsylvania, and one into each of the World Trade
Center towers. 66
62 See Murphy, supra note 61, at 239-40 (quoting Bin Laden's fatwa in which he
decried American presence at Islamic holy sites); see also Al-Qaeda's War Comes Full-
Circle - to Saudi Arabia, THE STRAITS TIMES, Jan. 12, 2005 (pointing out that Osama Bin
Laden resented presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia following Gulf War of 1991).
63 See Mark Hamblett, U.S. Prosecutor Explains Delay in Charging Stewart, THE
RECORDER, July 24, 2004, at 2 (defining "fatwa" as religious edict); see also Chibli Mallat,
From Islamic to Middle Eastern Law A Restatement of the Field (Part II), 52 AM. J. COMP.
L. 209, 240-41 (2004) (explaining that fatwa under ordinary circumstances is mufti's (i.e.
a legal scholar's) binding response to inquiry about specific point of law, usually asked by
layperson).
64 Text of Fatwah Urging Jihad Against Americans, February 23, 1998 at
http://www.ict.org.il/articles/fatwah.htm.
65 See Michael A. Goldberg, Note, Mirage of Defense: Reexamining Article Five of the
North Atlantic Treaty after the Terrorist Attacks on the United States, 26 B.C. INT'L COMP.
L. REV. 77, 82 (2003) (reciting events of attacks); see also Vincent-Joel Proulx, Rethinking
the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in the Post-September 11th Era:
Should Acts of Terrorism Qualify As Crimes Against Humanity?, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
1009, 1036 (2004) (recalling that over 3,000 individuals died as result of events of
September 11, 2001).
66 See Proulx, supra note 65, at 1036 (referring to September 11, 201 attacks as
"universal knowledge"); see also Goldberg, supra note 65, at 81-82 (recounting hijacking
2006] 395
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The day after the attack, it was reported that United States
officials had strong evidence that Al Qaeda was responsible for
the devastation. 67 Congress immediately responded with the
passage of the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)68
on September 18, 2001. Through this legislation, Congress
granted the President express authority to use military force
against combatants who are engaged in armed conflict with the
United States. 69 More specifically, it permits the president to
"use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks," or "harbored such
organizations or persons."70
The specific language used by Congress in the AUMF is, in and
of itself, evidence that this nation's legislature was in favor of a
"functionalist" constitutional approach to presidential power
during national crises. 71 The authorization is for the President
of four airliners, two that targeted World Trade Center, one that targeted Pentagon in
Washington, D.C., and one that crashed in Pennsylvania). See generally NAT'L COMM'N
ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, 1-14, 285-311
(2004) (describing sequence of events that led to terrorist attacks).
67 See Dan Eggen & Vernon Loeb, U.S. Intelligence Points to Bin Laden Network, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 12, 2001 at Al (stating that officials cited probability of Bin
Laden's link to attack in high 90's, while others said evidence "strongly suggested" his
involvement); Ed Hayward & Tom Farmer, Attack on America; Terrorists Strike N. Y,
D.C., THE BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 12, 2001, at 002 (quoting high ranking federal law
enforcement official as stating that although no one had been ruled out, "[Bin Laden] is
top of our list at this point"); see also David Johnston & James Risen, A Day of Terror;
Intelligence Agencies; Officials Say They Saw Signs of Increased Terrorist Activity, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001 at A21 (stating that electronic eavesdropping intercepts indicated
that attacks of September 11th were planned and executed by Al Qaeda).
68 107 P.L. 40 (2001) (hereinafter AUMF) (authorizing military action against those
responsible for September 11, 2001 attacks). See generally Charles M. Madigan & Tribute
News Services, Bush Boosts Police Powers; Legal Immigrants Could Be Subject to Long
Detentions, CHI. TRIBUNE, Sept. 19, 2001, at 1 (reporting that Bush signed Congressional
resolution "authorizing him to use military force against those responsibl[e]").
69 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004) (explaining that congressional
authorization to use force applied to any individuals, nations or organizations who aided
or took part in terrorist attacks, or harbored such organizations or persons); see also
Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Supreme Court Requires Rights for Counter-terrorism Detainee, 20
INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 385, 388 (2004) (discussing Court's rationale for holding in
Hamdi).
70 See AUMF, supra note 28 (outlining authority granted to President); David D.
Coron & Jenny S. Martinez, International Decision: Availability of U.S. Courts to Review
Decision to Hold U.S. Citizens as Enemy Combatants - Executive Power in War on Terror,
98 A.J.I.L. 782, 788 n.18 (citing language of AUMF).
71 See Curtis Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War
on Terror, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2082 (2005) (noting that describing, rather than
naming, enemies outlined in Act can be interpreted as giving President broad power to
determine identity of targeted groups or individuals); John Yoo, War, Responsibility, and
the Age of Terrorism, 57 STANFORD L. REV. 793, 820-21 (2005) (arguing that AUMF
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to use appropriate force against those "he determines" to be
involved in the attacks.72  However, to prevent an
unconstitutional delegation of powers from the legislature to the
executive other, the AUMF does not actually authorize the
President to decide whether an entity falls within the class of
"enemy terrorists" as specified in the legislation. 73 Nonetheless,
through the language giving the president authority to use
"necessary and appropriate force" the AUMF consented to
executive power to legally detain such individuals for the
duration of the hostilities between our nation and Al Qaeda. 74
III. CHALLENGE OF EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY DURING NATIONAL
CRISIS: RASUL V. BUSH
After the enactment of the AUMF, President Bush acted
pursuant to his newly granted authority, and ordered the
American military to enter Afghanistan on a mission to destroy
Al Qaeda and the government providing it refuge, the Taliban. 75
During the hostilities that occurred in Afghanistan, the United
States troops captured numerous enemy combatants. These
prisoners have been held by the military at the United States
naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba since early 2002.76
While it seemed to have been long established by the Supreme
Court that enemy aliens who are being detained outside of the
United States were not entitled to challenge their imprisonment
represented rejection by Congress of more deliberate decision making process in
identification of targets because of unconventional nature of conflict).
72 See AUMF, supra note 68.
73 AUMF, supra note 68; see Thomas Geraghty, Case Comment, The Criminal-Enemy
Distinction: Prosecuting a Limited War Against Terrorism Following the September 11,
2001 Attacks, 33 McGEORGE L. REV. 551, 574 (2002) (explaining AUMF has not given
President unrestrained power to declare war on any person he regards as enemy).
74 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004) (stating government estimates
that there are approximately six hundred and forty enemy combatants detained in
Guantanamo Bay); see also Lt. Col. (S) Joseph P. Bialke, Al-Qaeda & Taliban Unlawful
Combatant Detainees, Unlawful Belligerency, and the International Laws of Armed
Conflict, 55 A.F. L. Rev. 1, 1 (2004) (noting detainees hail from over forty nations).
75 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470 (2004); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld; Secretary
of Defense; New Jersey Supreme Court; CRIMINAL PRACTICE- Habeas Corpus -
Military Law, N.J.L.J., July 4, 2004 (discussing Supreme Court decision in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld).
76 See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470 (stating government estimate of about six-hundred and
forty enemy combatants detained at Guantanamo).
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and seek habeas corpus, 77 the issue again arose with the 2004
case of Rasul v. Bush. Fourteen of the approximate six-hundred
and forty detainees brought an action against the United States
government that challenged the legality of their imprisonment. 78
Two of the petitioners who appealed the case to the Supreme
Court are Australian citizens, while twelve of them are citizens of
Kuwait. 79 Each was captured in Afghanistan during the conflict
between the United States and the Taliban.80
The detainees filed a claim seeking to be informed of the
charges against them, to be allowed to meet with counsel, to be
granted access to courts or some other impartial tribunal, and
claimed that denial of these rights was unconstitutional and in
violation of international law and United States treaties.S1
The district court viewed the case as an action for writs of
habeas corpus, and held that courts are not capable of extending
the writ of habeas corpus beyond the sovereign territory of the
United States.82 The court specified that those aliens who are
captured abroad during hostilities do not even have qualified
access to courts, as opposed to the permissible access of aliens
with lawful residence within this country.8 3 The Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court's holding, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed.8 4 It concluded that the habeas
statute gives a right to judicial review of the legality of the
Executive detention of aliens in a territory over which the United
States does not have ultimate sovereignty, but only plenary and
exclusive jurisdiction. 85 Many commentators have suggested that
this holding was a direct rebuke to the Bush Administration's
77 See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (noting essence of habeas corpus
is attack by a person in custody upon legality of that custody, and that traditional
function of writ is to secure release from illegal custody).
78 See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470-71 (explaining that petitioners filed their actions
through relatives acting as their next friends).
79 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470 (2004).
80 Id.
81 Id. at 471.
82 Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 65 (2004).
83 See id. at 66 (explaining nonresident enemy alien has no claim in courts of United
States and that use of courts might help enemy (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S.
763, 766 (1950))); see also Eisenstrager, 339 U.S. at 766 (tracing principle back to 1813).
84 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 471-72 (2004) (outlining procedural history of case).
85 Id. at 484 (outlining holding).
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'imperialist' foreign policy, but others argue that it was an
impediment to the current conflict.8 6
Based on the evidence collected by United States intelligence
indicating that terrorist organizations, including Al Qaeda, plan
to further destabilize the United States, as well as the attacks on
September 11, 2001, it could be argued that the judiciary should
consequently narrowly interpret the rights of those captured
overseas. Instead, the judiciary engaged in activism by using
arbitrary bases to reduce the authority that had been granted to
the Executive by the AUMF, in contravention of Congress'
determination.8 7
The government, the respondents in this case, contended that
the issue of habeas relief for enemy detainees was controlled by
Johnson v. Eisentrager,88 in which it was held that a federal
court did not have the authority to grant the writ of habeas
corpus to German citizens who were captured by the United
States military in China, and detained in a German prison.8 9 In
Eisenstrager, the prisoners were enemy aliens that had never
been in the United States, and were captured, tried, and
convicted by a military commission outside of American
borders. 90 Using all of those factors, the Court determined that
the prisoners were not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. 91 The
Rasul Court distinguished the case from Eisentrager by relying
86 See, e.g., Christopher M. Schumann, Note, Bring It On: The Supreme Court Opens
the Floodgates with Rasul v. Bush, 55 A.F. L. REV. 349, 367 (2004) (claiming that Court's
decision will undermine President's efforts to combat terrorism); Jed Babbin, Habeas
Corpus?, AMERICAN SPECTATOR ONLINE, Mar. 21, 2005 (calling Rasul an "absurd decision"
because it extends rights to enemies); Andrew C. McCarthy, Gonzales & the War, NAT'L
REVIEW ONLINE, July 8, 2005 (suggesting that decision will allow enemies to use
American courts against citizens as weapons).
87 See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 506 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rebuking Court for interfering
and departing from precedent when proper course would have been to allow Congress to
change law, if it so desired); Schumann, supra note 86, at 367 (claiming it was role of
Congress, not Court, to change rule).
88 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
89 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 475 (2004) (stating basis of government's
argument); see also Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 766 (listing facts of case).
90 See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777 (1950).
91 See id. (concluding that list of factors in Eisentrager controlled holding in that case
(citing Eisenstrager, 339 U.S. at 781)); see also David A. Martin, Offshore Detainees and
the Role of Courts After Rasul v. Bush: The Underappreciated Virtues of Deferential
Review, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 125, 129 (2005) (reviewing concerns of Eisentrager
court that led to denial of writ).
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heavily on the absence of some of those factors. It noted that the
petitioners differed from those in Eisentrager for the following
reasons: they were not nationals of countries at war with the
United States, they denied having engaged in or plotting acts of
aggression against the United States, they had never been heard
before a tribunal or convicted of wrongdoing, and they have been
imprisoned in a territory over which the United States exercises
exclusive jurisdiction.92 In addition, the Court declined to apply
Eisentrager to an interpretation of the habeas statute.93
The Rasul majority reasoned that the Eisentrager Court failed
to analyze the habeas statute based on the decision in Ahrens v.
Clark.94 In that case, detainee petitioners were one-hundred and
twenty Germans who were being detained at Ellis Island, New
York before being deported back to Germany. 95 They had filed
petitions under the habeas statute in the U.S District Court in
the District of Columbia, but the Court interpreted the term
"within their respective jurisdictions," as written in the statute
as a requirement that the petitioners be present within the
territorial jurisdiction of the district court. 96 However, the Rasul
Court relied on yet another case, Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit
Court of Kentucky, 97 in which the Supreme Court held that "the
writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks
relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be
unlawful custody."98 Therefore, it was determined that, based on
the language of the habeas statute, a district court is acting
within its respective jurisdiction as long as the custodian of the
detainee can be reached by service of process. 99 The Rasul
92 See Martin, supra note 91, at 129 (listing distinguishing factors between
petitioners in Eisentrager and those in Rasul); see also Habeas Corpus, 118 HARV. L. REV.
396, 398 (2004) (noting Court's distinction between factors present in Rasul and
Eisentrager).
93 See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475 (relating Eisentrager factors solely to constitutional
rights); see also Habeus Corpus, supra note 91, at 398 (positing that court has interpreted
Eisentrager factors as constitutionally based).
94 335 U.S. 188 (1948).
95 See id. at 189 (explaining deportation was ordered because Attorney General found
them to be dangerous to safety of this country); see also Rasul, 542 U.S. 466, 476-77
(2004) (referring to historical context in which Eisentrager was decided).
96 See Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 190 (asserting that it is not sufficient that custodian or
jailer be within jurisdiction); see also Rasul, 542 U.S. at 476-77 (noting that Ahrens was
decided two months after petitioners filed habeas petition).
97 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
98 Id. at 494 (citing Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)).
99 See id. at 495; see also Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478-79.
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majority interpreted Braden as having implicitly overruled the
statutory condition that Ahrens imposed on the Eisentrager
Court. Therefore, based on this aspect of its reasoning, the Rasul
Court found a loophole allowing it to overlook the Eisentrager
precedent in favor of permitting the exercise of statutory
jurisdiction over the detainees' claim.100
The government asserted that it is a well established precedent
in American law that unless intentions are otherwise clear, there
is a presumption that congressional legislation does not apply in
an extraterritorial context.101 The Court quickly rejected this
argument.102 Relying on Foley Brothers, Inc. v Filardo,10 3 the
majority noted that presumptions against extraterritoriality in
other contexts are not applicable regarding the function of the
habeas statute when detainees are being held within "the
territorial jurisdiction" of the United States.104 Drawing from a
1903 naval agreement between the United States and Cuba, the
Court interpreted territorial jurisdiction to mean one nation
exercising "complete jurisdiction and control"105 over a territory,
specifically over the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba.106
The Court found the possession of ultimate sovereignty over the
land to be irrelevant.
The majority additionally asserted that the habeas statute
does not distinguish between Americans and aliens held in
federal custody. As a result, the Court held that there was no
reason to assume that the legislature intended for the statute's
100 See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 2493 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing Court took "oblique
course" to maneuver around precedent set by Eisentrager); see also Martin, supra note 91
at 132-33 (stating that once Court found way to overlook Eisentrager precedent, statute
clearly allowed jurisdiction).
101 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004) (citing Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991)); cf. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 499
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (recognizing argument, but dismissing it as irrelevant).
102 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480 (stating there is little reason to think Congress intended
geographical coverage of statute to vary depending on detainee's citizenship).
103 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
104 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480.
105 See Lease of Coaling or Naval Stations, Agreement Between the United States
and Cuba, Art. III, February 1903 (available at www.nsgtmo.navy.mil/gazette/History-
98064/hisapxd.htm) (granting United States jurisdiction over described areas); see also
Gherebi v. Bush, 374 F.3d 727, 734 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining United States was granted
exclusive right to try individuals for crimes committed on base in supplemental
agreement with Cuba).
106 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004).
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geographic coverage to change depending on the detainee's
citizenship.107 Historical references to old English common lawl0 8
reiterated the Court's adherence to the theory that a federal
court has jurisdiction over a claim of a detainee whose custodian
is reachable by service of process.109
In the final words of its decision, the majority addressed the
petitioners' claim that they had the right to be heard under the
federal question statute' 10 and the Alien Tort Statute.i"l The
Court again rejected the lower courts' determination that aliens
lack the right to litigate in United States courts.112 In fact, the
Court held that the Alien Tort Statute explicitly grants to aliens
the right to bring suit for an actionable tort in the United States.
It was further held that the status of petitioners as military
detainees is irrelevant to the question of federal jurisdiction over
non-habeas statutory claims.113
A. Rasul v. Bush: The Dissenting Opinion
In the dissent by Justice Scalia, the majority's decision was
referred to as "contradicting a half-century-old precedent."114 In
Justice Scalia's view, that precedent was based on logical
reasoning and can be read as a warning to future justices about
107 Id. at 480 (mentioning fact that government conceded that habeas statute would
give federal jurisdiction over claims by American citizen held at Guantanamo).
108 See id. at 482. Such historical references included citations to Lord Mansfield's
1759 writing in which he maintained that "even if a territory was 'no part of the realm',
there was 'no doubt' as to the courts' power to issue writs of habeas corpus if the territory
was 'under the subjection of the Crown."' Id. at 2697 (citing King v. Cowle, 2 Burr. 834,
854-55 (1759)).
109 See id. at 482 (positing that precedent has confirmed that reach of writ, both
historically and in modern era, does not depend on formal notions of territorial
sovereignty but rather on actual extent of jurisdiction exercised).
110 28 U.S.C.S. §1331.
111 28 U.S.C.S. §1350. See generally Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484 (citing both statutes).
112 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483 (2004) (holding Eisentrager did not bar exercise
of federal court jurisdiction over habeas corpus claims asserted by petitioners and
similarly does not exclude aliens detained in military custody outside United States from
litigating claims in United States courts).
113 Id. at 485 (stating Alien Tort Statute explicitly grants ability to sue for actionable
torts committed in violation of law of nations or of treaty of United States and that
petitioners' status was immaterial to question of jurisdiction).
114 Id. at 488-89 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to Johnson v. Eisenstrager, 339
U.S. 763 (1950), in which Court held that habeas statute did not extend to aliens detained
by United States military overseas, outside sovereign borders of United States and
beyond territorial jurisdictions of all its courts).
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the dangers inherent in failing to appreciate its result.115 The
Eisentrager opinion stated:
To grant the writ to these prisoners might mean that our
army must transport them across the seas for hearing. This
would require allocation of shipping space, guarding
personnel, billeting and rations. It might also require
transportation for whatever witnesses the prisoners desired
to call as well as transportation for those necessary to defend
legality of the sentence. The writ, since it is held to be a
matter of right, would be equally available to enemies during
active hostilities as in the present twilight between war and
peace. Such trials would hamper the war effort and bring
aid and comfort to the enemy. They would diminish the
prestige of our commanders, not only with enemies but with
wavering neutrals. It would be difficult to devise more
effective fettering of a field commander than to allow the
very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call
him to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts
and attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal
defensive at home. Nor is it unlikely that the result of such
enemy litigiousness would be a conflict between judicial and
military opinion highly comforting to enemies of the United
States.116
These essential words of the Court were cited by Justice Scalia's
dissent, and they are indispensable in assessing the potential
consequences of the Rasul decision.117
Justice Scalia first addresses the majority's interpretation of
the habeas statute, and asserts that its reading is contradictory
to the plain meaning of the statute's language. He argues that
regardless of whether the writ is directed to a custodian or
detainee, the statute clearly requires that a federal district court
115 See id. at 499 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing majority too swiftly disregarded
warnings voiced by Eisentrager Court and that decision could have injurious
consequences).
116 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 736, 778-79.
117 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 499 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Court has disregarded warning offered by Eisentrager court without statutory basis and
based on inadequate case law); see also Robert Hardaway, The Role of the Media, Law,
and National Resolve in the War on Terror, 33 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POLY 104, 126 (2004)
(noting that during World War II, United States had approximately two million foreign
soldiers in its custody, many of whom could have challenged detainment in American
courts absent Eisentrager decision).
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have territorial jurisdiction over the detainee.ll8 In addition, he
pointed to Eisentrager as holding that there was no wording in
the habeas statute granting a right to the writ.119 He argued that
the statute's obvious language precluded the Court from
discussing what should have been a clear statutory result.120
Turning to the majority's declaration that Braden overruled
Ahrens, Justice Scalia simply rejects this reading of the latter
decision by explaining that Braden is distinguishable from the
general rule of Ahrens.121 He pointed to the circumstances in
Braden, in which a habeas petitioner was detained in Alabama
and filed for a writ of habeas corpus in Kentucky. Under these
particular facts, the Braden Court held that when a petitioner is
confined by multiple jurisdictions within the United States, he is
permitted to seek habeas relief to his legal confinement in the
jurisdiction in which he is legally confined.122 That rule was
reiterated in the recent case of Rumsfeld v. Padilla,123 in which
the Court explained that identification of the legally controlling
118 See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 489 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that habeus statute
mandates that "the order of a circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district
court of the district wherein the restraint complained of is had" (quoting 28 U.S.C.S.
§2241(a))); see also Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973)
(highlighting limitation of § 2241(a), which states that "the court issuing the writ ha[s]
jurisdiction over the custodian").
119 See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 493 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reasoning "nothing in the text
of the Constitution extends such a right, nor does anything in our statutes" (citing
Johnson v. Eisenstrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 (1950))); see also Schumann, supra note 86, at
362 (2004) (recognizing Eisentrager's holding that no right to habeas existed under
statute).
120 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 492-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia believes that the
Eisentrager Court's treatment of the statute indicates that they believed it to be obvious
that the "statute did not confer jurisdiction over an alien detained outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States." Id. Scalia argues that this makes the
majority's holding problematic. See Schumann, supra note 86, at 362. Scalia believes that
the Eisentrager Court spent little time analyzing this issue because the statute clearly
declined to extend jurisdiction to this alien. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 493 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
121 See id. at 493-494 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing Braden Court was careful to
distinguish facts of the case from Ahrens); see also Schumann, supra note 86, at 362-63
(noting that Justice Scalia believed that majority improperly relied on Braden in Rasul).
122 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 494 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disagreeing
with majority's treatment of Braden on grounds that Braden did not question general
rule established in Ahrens); see also Braden, 410 U.S. at 499-500 (holding that Ahrens
could not be interpreted as creating an inflexible jurisdictional rule in light of class of
cases not foreseeable at time of decision).
123 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). Mr. Padilla, a military detainee, was
transferred from federal to military custody by an order of the President to the Secretary
of Defense. Id. The detainee sought habeas relief in the original district of his detention.
Id. The Court held that habeas jurisdiction was limited to the district in which the
detainee was confined, and the commander of that individuals' military confinement
facility was the proper custodian for relief. Id.
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party is only necessary when there is no immediate physical
custodian with respect to the challenged detainment.1 24
The Braden holding was based on the principle that a State
detaining an individual acts as a general agent for the
demanding State, and it is presumably indifferent to the
resolution of the prisoner's attack on the detainer state. 25 Under
these particular circumstances, the Braden Court determined
that application of the Ahrens rule was unnecessary.1 26 As a
result, Justice Scalia argued that the Braden decision cannot be
read as overruling the Ahrens rule in other circumstances, and
that Eisentrager controls Rasul because the issue is physical
custody.127 The dissent concludes that the Rasul opinion
independently overrules Eisentrager and for the first time
extends the habeas statute to aliens detained beyond the
sovereign territory of the United States and beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of the federal courts.128
Furthermore, Justice Scalia addressed the Court's reasoning
concerning the "presumption against extraterritorial effect."129
He rejects the "complete jurisdiction" argument based on the fact
that the lease agreement unequivocally reserved the ultimate
sovereignty over the territory to Cuba.130 He was also disturbed
by the Court's lack of explanation about how "complete
124 See Wellington Gu, Note, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004), 11 WASH. &
LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L. J. 251, 256 (2004). There was no immediate physical
custodian in Braden; thus, the immediate custodian rule was inapplicable to the case. See
id. The Padilla majority reasoned that the immediate custodian rule did not apply to
Braden because of the lack of an immediate custodian germane to the case. Padilla, 542
U.S. at 438-39.
125 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 494 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (outlining reasoning of Braden);
Braden, 410 U.S. 484, 498 (1974) (noting petitioner's legal dispute was with
Commonwealth of Kentucky).
126 Braden, 410 U.S. at 499 (noting that application of Ahrens rule under these
circumstances would require action be brought in Alabama); Cf. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 494
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (using this analysis to illustrate that Ahrens was not applied to
Braden because it was inapplicable).
127 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 494-95 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
Ahrens rule remained applicable and provided no obstacle to application of Eisentrager);
see also Tacho Lim, supra note 124, at 246 (2004) (noting Ahrens could still apply to other
situations).
128 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 496 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Rasul overruled
Eisentrager without reasoning or acknowledging result).
129 Id. at 500-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (attacking Court for inadequacy of
presumption).
130 Id.
2006]
406 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:2
jurisdiction and control" without ultimate sovereignty results in
a territory being reachable by United States domestic laws.131 If,
as the Court held, there is no real difference between jurisdiction
and control acquired through a lease and that obtained by lawful
armed force, Justice Scalia argues that Afghanistan and Iraq
would be considered subject to domestic laws. 132
The majority's second justification for their ruling, the
government's concession that American citizens on the naval
base are subject to habeas jurisdiction, was also the subject of
Justice Scalia's criticism. He argued that United States citizens
have greater rights under the habeas statute because of their
constitutional privileges.133 He noted that the Eisentrager Court
maintained that United States citizens are entitled to inalienable
habeas rights no matter where in the world they are located,
while holding that foreign nationals outside of the country did
not possess such rights.134
B. Consequences of the Decision
While the Court maintains that Eisentrager has not been
overruled, the effects of the Rasul decision are inapposite. The
President is now faced with a narrowing of the authority granted
by Congress in the AUMF. The legislation enabled the
Administration to detain those it categorized as enemy
combatants, without permitting the detainees to seek traditional
relief.135 Now that the Court has entitled enemy aliens who are
held in Guantanamo Bay to petition for habeas in any of the
ninety-four federal districts, executive authority has been
undermined, and the efforts in the war on terror could be
hindered.
The Rasul majority opposed what it perceived as a delegation
of excessive authority to the Executive Branch. The majority
evaded the principle of stare decisis and "plain meaning"
statutory construction to reach their holding. The Court failed to
131 Id.
132 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 494-95 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517-18 (2004).
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expressly overrule Eisentrager, because the Court would have
had to contradict its earlier reasoning. 136
The earliest cases that the Court addressed concerning
Executive powers at wartime narrowly construed Executive
authority under Article II of the Constitution.137 It did not
interpret the Executive War Power to grant a President any
exceptional authority during times of war.138 These cases
emphasized that the Constitution applied equally to rulers and
citizens, in times of war and peace, in all circumstances.139 The
Court developed a new perspective in the 20th century, deferring
to the Executive branch in times of crisis. 140 That was the trend
until 2004, when the Rasul decision illustrated the Court's
apparent desire to reinforce the separation of powers and revoke
any presidential authority it deemed an overly broad
interpretation of Article II.
Similarly, cases challenging congressional power under the
Commerce Clause141 have followed an analogous pattern. The
earlier cases imposed a more strict interpretation of Congress'
authority, such as in United States v. E. C. Knight C0.1 42 The
Court distinguished between manufacture and commerce, stating
that manufacture is a transformation of raw materials into a
form for use, while commerce included buying, selling and
transportation of items. 143 The Court also emphasized that the
solely internal commerce of a state is considered to be reserved
136 See Hardaway, supra note 117, at 126; Rasul, 542 U.S. at 494.
137 See supra notes 12-55.
138 See e.g., Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 153 (1861) (concluding that
President cannot suspend habeas corpus rights without any Congressional authorization);
Ex Parte Milligan 71 U.S. 2, 131 (1866) (holding that President cannot prevent American
citizen held on grounds of Congressional suspension of habeas corpus from access to
Article III court if court is open).
139 Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 120-21.
140 J. Richard Broughton, What Is It Good For? War Power, Judicial Review, and
Constitutional Deliberation, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 685, 702 (2001) (arguing that pattern of
deference accelerated during Vietnam War era); Major Geoffrey S. Corn, Presidential
War Power: Do the Courts Offer Any Answers?, 157 MIL. L. REV. 180, 183 (1998)
(suggesting doctrinal change reflects shift in predominance of Executive Branch as United
States "emerged... as a world power").
141 U.S. CONST. ART. I, §8, cl.3 ("The Congress shall have Power To... regulate
Commerce ... among the several States").
142 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding manufacture is not commerce, and a monopoly was not
subject to Congressional regulation).
143 Id.
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for the state governments to control.144 After the New Deal, the
Court began to diminish the limits on the commerce power in
order to ensure the success of the President's recovery plan.145
Most recently however, the Court again began to impose stricter
limits on Congress' Commerce Power, a shift from the
interpretation it applied during the time period between 1937
and 1995. With United States v. Lopez,146  the Court
implemented a more rigid test to determine whether an activity
was within the reach of congressional commerce power.147
Lopez's retraction of the broad deference the Court had been
giving to the legislature mirrors the limits imposed on the Bush
Administration in Rasul. The pattern of granting the executive
deference in times of military emergency parallel the Court's
various interpretations of the commerce power over the last sixty
years. The Rehnquist Court was wary of the lack of limits on the
discretion of Congress under the deferential standard of review
used before Lopez.148 The necessity of broader congressional
power during the New Deal, and the need for a large
Congressional role in the civil rights movement were also
compelling justifications for a change.149 However, the crisis
144 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 70 (1824).
145 See Michael Comiskey, Can a President Pack - or Draft - The Supreme Court?
FDR and the Court in the Great Depression and World War Two, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1043,
1055 (1994) (noting Roosevelt-era Court interpreted Interstate Commerce Clause in
expansive fashion); see also Donald Ziegler, The New Activist Court, 45 AM. U.L. REV.
1367, 1391 (1996) (arguing Court's restrictive interpretation of Commerce Clause limited
effectiveness of economic recover programs until it adopted broader view of clause). See
generally Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (exemplifying Court's more expansive
reading of Commerce Clause).
146 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
147 Id. at 558-60 (listing three areas in which Congress has power to regulate
through commerce clause authority, including channels of interstate commerce,
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and that which substantially affect interstate
commerce); Jeanine A. Scalero, Case Note: The Endangered Species Act's Application to
Isolated Species: A Substantial Affect on Interstate Commerce?, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 317, 349
(2000) (applying test to regulation of isolated species).
148 See Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial
Activism: A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett: Restoring the Lost Constitution: The
Presumption of Liberty, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1091 (2005) (arguing since Lopez, Court
has "aggressively reviewed Congressional decisions"); see also Kristin A. Collins,
Federalism's Fallacy: The Early Tradition of Federal Family Law and the Invention of
States' Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1761, 1771 (2005) (explaining strict policing of
federalism in interest of promoting State sovereignty has been "revived" by the Supreme
Court's modern commerce clause jurisprudence).
149 See John C. Eastman, Judicial Review of Unenumerated Rights: Does Marbury's
Holding Apply in a Post-Warren Court World?, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 713, 733 (2005)
(arguing that expansive interpretation of Congressional power is based on practical policy
determinations); Catherine Laughlin, Expert Testimony: Bridging Bioethics and Evidence
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facing our nation today is as dangerous, if not more, than World
War II, when the executive was granted more authority during
wartime. Analogous to the necessity of broader commerce power
during the New Deal and the greater deference to the executive
throughout World War II, current circumstances genuinely
warrant providing the executive with more discretionary
authority to act in the interest of national security. According to
Justice Jackson's "Tripartite Analysis," the Executive is acting
with authorization from Congress.
In declaring that it was not going to rely on Eisentrager in
deciding the present case, the Court listed a number of factors to
distinguish the facts from those in the prior case. 150 The first
factor listed is that the petitioners are not nationals of countries
at war with the United States. However, this is not a relevant
factor, as the war on terror is not a traditional war in that the
United States is not fighting a nation, but a terrorist
organization. Al Qaeda is an organization comprised of members
who are citizens of numerous countries. Under these
circumstances, it is inappropriate to apply a factor based on a
traditional paradigm of combat to this conflict. Al Qaeda is not a
state-sponsored terrorist organization, and nationality is of
limited use in determining the rights of the petitioners.
The second factor mentioned by the Court as relevant to its
decision is that the petitioners deny having engaged in or plotted
any aggression against the United States. 151 This factor is of
questionable relevance. It is highly doubtful that any detainee
who petitions for habeas relief will in fact admit to wrongdoing,
so it is surprising that the Court would give any weight to this
assertion. While it may be argued that detainees have the right
to have a court determine their guilt or innocence, allowing their
claim of innocence to influence the Court's determination of
whether habeas should extend to Guantanamo is simply illogical.
Law: Recent Developments in Health Law: U.S. Supreme Court Hears Oral Arguments in
Ashcroft v. Raich Background, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 396, 397 (2005) (explaining
Congress used deference granted it by Supreme Court to enact civil rights, environmental
protection, and minimum wage legislation on the basis of "substantial effect on
commerce" doctrine).
150 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 475 (2004) (distinguishing present facts from those in
Eisentrager).
151 Id.
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After extending habeas to those being held in Guantanamo, all
who petition for relief will likely make the same claim of
innocence. Consequently, the assertion of innocence by these
particular detainees should be irrelevant to the issue of whether
jurisdiction under the habeas statute extends to detainees in
Guantanamo Bay.
The Court also noted that the detainees have been imprisoned
for more than two years. It is submitted that these lengthy
detention periods could serve as evidence that the government is
not yet comfortable releasing these individuals. As reported only
days after the Rasul decision, the government is aware of at least
five out of the fifty-seven detainees who had been released from
Guantanamo Bay and subsequently returned to the battlefield to
fight against the United States in Afghanistan. 152 While the fact
that these individuals were released is evidence that the
government needs to check its intelligence extremely carefully
before freeing any of the detainees, this justifies the
government's policy of lengthy detention because extensive
interrogation and background checks must be performed before
release is possible. Some of the detainees have been well trained
in counter-interrogation techniques, making it more difficult for
the United States government to make these determinations.1 53
The majority heavily relies on its interpretation that Ahrens
was overruled by Braden. This reading is a crucial rationale
underlying the primary holding in Rasul. Based on the belief
that Ahrens is no longer valid, the Court follows the Braden
assertion that the presence of a detainee within the territorial
jurisdiction of the district court is not a necessary prerequisite to
the exercise of that court's jurisdiction under the habeas
statute. 154 Instead, the majority applies the Braden rule that the
writ does not act on the individual who seeks relief, but upon the
detainer who holds him in the allegedly unlawful custody. 155
152 Shaun Waterman, Released Detainees Return to Fighting U.S., THE WASHINGTON
TIMES, July 6, 2004 (available at www.washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20040705-
080713-4578r.htm).
153 See id. (noting that one detainee had thirteen aliases).
154 See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973) (explaining
this was rule in Ahrens, but facts of present case call for different interpretation); see also
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478-79 (discussing why Ahrens rule was not applied).
155 See Braden, 410 U.S. at 494 (citing Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564 (1885)); see
also Rasul, 542 U.S. at 477 (asserting that it is only necessary for custodian to be within
reach of service of process).
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The application of Braden to Rasul is flawed. While Justice
Rehnquist's dissent in Braden stated "today the Court overrules
Ahrens,"156 this should be read in the same manner as Justice
Scalia's dissenting statement that Rasul overruled
Eisentrager.157 It is not in actuality what occurred, but reflects
the dissent's view of the potential consequences of the majority
holding. In reality, the facts of Braden and Ahrens are
distinguishable. The Braden Court sets aside the Ahrens rule
because the facts of the case are diverse, and the application of
Ahrens would not be in the best interests of the United States.
While Ahrens, like Rasul, dealt with aliens who were found to be
dangerous to the safety and peace of the United States,158 the
petitioner in Braden was a United States citizen who was being
imprisoned in Alabama and seeking habeas relief in Kentucky. 159
The Braden Court noted critical developments that had
occurred since the Ahrens decision, which reduced any need to
apply the Ahrens rule.160 These developments included an
expanded interpretation of the custody requirement in the
habeas statute, which allowed a prisoner being held in one state
to challenge a detainer lodged against him in another state. 161
The Court ruled that under those particular circumstances,
application of the Ahrens rule would not be useful. This
emphasizes the different circumstances in Braden and Ahrens.
The Braden Court did not assert an overruling of Ahrens, but
instead stated that the earlier decision was no longer considered
an "inflexible jurisdictional rule."162 As a result, a court assessing
the rights of a petitioner in a situation similar to Braden should
follow the case's holding. However, a case with facts similar to
156 Braden, 410 U.S. at 502 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
157 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 496 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing reality
of opinion being that Eisentrager no longer controls).
158 Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 189 (1948) (giving background of case facts).
159 Braden, 410 U.S. at 485 (noting the circumstances of the petitioner).
160 Id. at 498-99 (explaining why Ahrens rule was not followed for these set of facts);
see Rasul, 542 U.S at 494 (using Braden Court's language in furtherance of dissenting
opinion).
161 Braden, 410 U.S. 484, 498 (1973) (asserting relevancy of expanded custody
requirement).
162 Id. at 499-500.
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Ahrens should be controlled by Ahrens, and ultimately
Eisentrager. Rasul falls into the latter category.
The Braden majority clearly recognized that part of the
rationale directing the Ahrens decision was Congress' major
concern that extending the habeas statute to dangerous aliens
would result in extreme risks involved in the "production of
prisoners from remote sections, perhaps thousands of miles from
the District Court that issued the writ. The opportunities for
escape afforded by travel, the cost of transportation, the
administrative burden of such an undertaking negate such a
purpose."163 Those risks are still an important aspect of granting
habeas to individuals being held outside of the territorial
jurisdiction of the district. The Rasul Court overlooked these
concerns and interpreted the statute in its own complicated
manner.
In relying on the Braden rule that the habeas statute only
requires jurisdiction over the custodian, the Rasul Court has, as
Justice Scalia stated, "boldly extend[ed] the scope of the habeas
statute to the four corners of the world."164 The potential results
of this rule include the possibility of an enemy alien who is
captured on a foreign battlefield to bring a habeas petition under
the statute. 165 As long as it is an American who is the custodian
and can be reached by the jurisdiction of federal courts, there
may be no geographical limits on detainees bringing petitions.
Enemy aliens could be tried in whatever tribunal has jurisdiction
over the American custodian. While this may not have been the
Court's intention, the language in the opinion is susceptible to
this interpretation.
III. SOLUTION: AN EMERGENCY CONSTITUTION?
During the most recent emergency situations that have faced
the United States, the Supreme Court has given deference to the
Executive Branch. Alarmingly, we have now seen Rasul change
that pattern. The Court has a legitimate interest in maintaining
the tripartite separation of powers, and ensuring that the
163 Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 191; see Braden, 410 U.S. at 496 (quoting Ahrens, 335 U.S. at
191).
164 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 497-98 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (listing
potential consequences of holding).
165 Id.
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Executive Branch does not disrupt the balance of power by overly
intruding on the interests of other branches. Granting the
Executive slightly expanded powers during times of national
crises, the Court would not be in jeopardy of obliterating the
system of government that makes the United States worth
protecting.
There is an ongoing debate between two conflicting views on
executive powers during emergency situations: the
"accommodation" view and the "strict enforcement" view. 166 The
"accommodation" view is that the Constitution should be relaxed,
or even suspended during an emergency because at such times
powers must be concentrated in the federal government,
particularly in the executive. 167 This would allow the executive to
move more vigorously against the threat. Those who advocate
this view believe that constitutional rights and powers that are
appropriate for times of peace are not the same as those suitable
for emergency situations because the national security benefits of
granting an executive nearly unlimited power in times of crises
justify any risks to civil liberties.168
The opposing view to "accommodation" is "strict enforcement."
Proponents of "strict enforcement" believe that constitutional
rules should not be at all relaxed during times of emergency. 169
They rely on the levels of scrutiny that the Court uses to analyze
166 See Norman Dorsen, Here and There: Foreign Affairs and Civil Liberties, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 840, 845 (1989) (explaining how "strict enforcement" view ensures civil liberties
will be judicially protected without resulting in negative impact on national security); see
also Oren Gross, Chaos and Rule: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L. J. 1011, 1023 (2003) (arguing that in congruence with
"accommodation" view, government officials should violate Constitution during
emergencies). See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating
Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605, 606 (2003) (explaining differences between two sides).
167 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 166, at 606 n.1 (explaining three variances of
"accommodation" view, all of which suggest that Constitution be relaxed or suspended
during period of emergency); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT.
REV. 47, 49-50 (2004) (describing concept of "National Security Minimalism", which
essentially describes the "accommodation view").
168 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 166, at 607 (stating "[tihere is no reason to
think that the constitutional rights and powers appropriate for an emergency are the
same as those that prevail during times of normalcy"); see also Sunstein, supra note 167,
at 49-50 (stating some favor expansion in authority of Executive Branch during crisis
because "the President must be permitted to do what needs to be done to protect the
countr[y]").
169 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 166, at 608 (suggesting that approach balances
government interests and civil liberties).
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governmental action, which change based on the amount of
infringement on civil liberties, as making some constitutional
exceptions during national crises. 170  Therefore, strict
enforcement advocates believe that in applying strict scrutiny
during emergencies, laws that would not be permitted in
peacetime would be acceptable based on the government's
"compelling interest."171 Thus, "strict enforcement" would achieve
a similar result to the "accommodation" approach, without
abandoning constitutional constraints.
One of the more recent emerging views is that of enacting
emergency provisions to the Constitution. Commentators and
analysts have projected that the United States will be a target of
terrorist attacks on its soil for the foreseeable future.
Consequently, some have proposed that we need to amend the
Constitution to deal with the protection of civil liberties while
still granting the executive exceptional emergency powers. 172 The
war on terror is considered an "imperfect" war, as it is a war not
formally declared by Congress, and is limited to specific places,
persons and things, not entire nations at battle.173 As a result of
its "imperfect" status, it is speculated that the war on terror will
not come to an end the way wars between sovereign states do,
and an emergency constitution will prevent an indefinite reign of
expanded executive powers. 174
As proposed, the emergency constitution would permit
executive unilateral action for a minimal period of time after the
occurrence of a crisis, such as one to two weeks.175 The majority
of the legislature would then have to approve the continuation of
170 See id. (noting Constitution already provides that level of protection for civil
liberties depends on interest of government).
171 Id. (suggesting approach balances government interests and civil liberties).
172 Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L. J. 1029, 1029 (2004)
(proposing emergency provisions that will prevent infringements on civil liberties while
granting enough authority to ensure protection of our country); see Posner & Vermeule,
supra note 166, at 605-06 (suggesting after September 11th, government has sought new
legal authority to combat terrorism).
173 Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37, 40 (1800) (differentiating between wars that are
considered "perfect" and "imperfect"); see Ackerman, supra note 172, at 1033 (explaining
difference between war on terrorism and traditional wars between sovereign states).
174 See Ackerman, supra note 172, at 1033 (asserting that even if Al Qaeda
disintegrates after Bin Laden is caught, other terrorist groups will likely emerge); see also
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 166, at 606-07 (noting that Constitutional rights and
powers appropriate for emergency are dissimilar to those in times of normalcy).
175 Ackerman, supra note 172, at 1047.
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the state of emergency for about two to three months. 176 After
this time period, it is asserted that continuation of the state of
emergency must require an escalating flow of supermajorities:
the next two months would require sixty percent, followed by
seventy percent, then eighty percent.177 Such a system would
likely prevent a state of emergency with expanded executive
authority from continuing for more than six months. Supporters
of this approach believe that it provides a balance between giving
the executive the authority necessary to address the threat
powerfully and reassure a panicked public, and protecting civil
liberties.178
Opponents of the proposed "emergency constitution" solution
believe that it would sacrifice morality for public safety. 179
Detention of suspects without the usual protections of probable
cause or reasonable suspicion was listed as one of the allowances
under the emergency system, and this is an issue with which
many have a problem.' 8 0 While it is important to remember that
such allowances under the emergency constitution would be for a
very limited period of time, similar provisions in Germany's
Weimar Constitution resulted in international disaster.I8 1 The
Weimar Constitution of 1919 facilitated Hitler's seizure of power
under the semblance of constitutional legitimacy.18 2  The
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 See Ackerman, supra note 172, at 1037 (outlining aim to design Constitutional
framework for temporary state of emergency that enables government to discharge the
reassurance function without doing long term damage to individual rights); see also
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 166, at 606-07 (stating that strictly enforcing
Constitution appropriately balances both civil liberties and government interests).
179 See David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution's Blind
Spot, 113 YALE L.J. 1753, 1758-59 (2004) (suggesting that incarcerating innocent
individuals in order to reassure panicked public is normatively unacceptable, irregardless
of any subsequent compensation); see also Posner & Vermeule, supra note 166, at 606
(noting that legality of emergency Constitution and issues it presents have been
contested).
180 See Ackerman, supra note 172, at 1037; see also Cole, supra note 179, at 1759
(noting that detainment without suspicion to reassure panicked public violates basic
commitments of moral society by treating these detainees as means to public relations
end).
181 See Ackerman, supra note 172, at 1039 (referring generally to German Federal
Constitution); see also Posner & Vermeule, supra note 166, at 643 (noting that Weimar
Government failed before rise of Adolf Hitler).
182 See Ackerman, supra note 172, at 1039 (explaining catastrophic role broad
emergency provisions in Weimar Constitution had in Nazi ascent); see also Posner &
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international community has since learned from each others'
mistakes. Therefore, a United States Constitution that in any
way resembled the German document that permitted the rise of
Hitler's totalitarian regime would be in violation of all of the
Framers' intentions.
While the emergency constitution proposes many intelligent
and functional approaches to granting the executive greater
authority during national crises, it is not a likely solution. First,
to implement such a system would require a constitutional
amendment. This means that Congress would have to vote by a
two-thirds majority in both the House and Senate to approve the
addition of emergency provisions into the Constitution.18 3 It is
highly unlikely that two thirds of each house would be willing to
abandon the constitutional structure that has well served this
nation since its framing, in favor of a high risk system granting
the executive essentially unlimited powers immediately after the
occurrence of a crisis. In addition, unlimited executive power
based on a sheer abandonment of the Constitution is not a
sensible course of action for a nation with its foundation in the
separation of powers. Expanded executive authority during
national crises is different from, and more acceptable than,
unlimited power.
The "accommodation" view of the Constitution during
emergency situations, while not advocating emergency
provisions, still requires relaxation or suspension. These are not
principles on which the United States government should
function. The necessary course of action for times of emergency
is that suggested by those of the "strict enforcement" view.
Throughout recent history, the Supreme Court has been granting
more deference to the executive in times of crisis. This has been
achieved constitutionally by following precedent and applying the
strict scrutiny analysis: finding executive actions narrowly
tailored to a compelling government interest. It may be more
advisable for the judiciary to instead apply a rational basis test
to executive acts in emergency situations, determining whether
the actions taken are rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest. This would guarantee more of an
Vermeule, supra note 166, at 607 (describing how Weimar Constitution's provisions
granted virtual dictatorial powers to Executive in times of emergency).
183 U.S. CONST. Art V.
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expansion of executive power when it is most required. Either
way, it is important not to stray from the Constitution. A
functionalist approach in accordance with the constitutional
structure, allowing some expansion and intermingling of powers
of the governmental branches, is most practical, and the wisest to
protect the integrity of the nation.
The problem with the Rasul decision is that it abandoned the
constitutional approach of deferring to the executive in times of
emergency, which was followed by the Supreme Court for
decades. This does not necessarily mean that there should be a
change in the way government has always functioned during
national crises, but instead it means that the Court's outcome
was not in the best interests of this country.
CONCLUSION
As the Court warned in Eisentrager, granting the writ of
habeas corpus to enemy aliens means that the United States will
be faced will numerous unnecessary inconveniences that will lead
to hindrances in the war on terror. The access to United States
courts in order to petition for habeas relief that was granted in
Rasul is in fact bringing comfort and assistance to the enemy.i8 4
When the case was decided, there were approximately six-
hundred and forty detainees at Guantanamo, and that number
may increase indefinitely. What the Court has essentially done
is give each of these detainees permission to inundate our
already crowded court system with their petitions. This will
further slow down the court proceedings of American citizens
who have legitimate claims, and to whom the Constitution should
be applied with first preference. In addition, this will take
members of the United States armed forces away from the
battlefields and homeland security, where they are most needed
in these tumultuous times, and instead place them as chaperones
to transport detainees to their hearings and court dates within
the United States.
184 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778-79 (1950); see also Rasul, 542 U.S.
466, 500 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The United States Constitution has guaranteed a form of
government that prevents any one branch from asserting too
much power. This structure should not be changed for times of
emergency. The process of granting the executive broader
powers to act during emergency situations does not infringe on
the Constitution. President Bush's actions in fighting the war on
terror and detaining those who are suspected to be involved with
Al Qaeda were in accordance with the authority granted to him
through the AUMF. As Justice Jackson stated in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co., a President acting with the implied or express
authorization of Congress is within his height of power.
Measures taken by the President pursuant to this power should
not have been challenged by the Supreme Court.
